BOURDIEUAN PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL POWER PRODUCTION: UNDERSTANDING THE EU AND MEMBER STATES' HARMONISED RESPONSES TO RUSSIA'S 2022 INCURSION INTO UKRAINE

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ABSTRACT

This paper contributes to the debate on science and practices as basic features in foreign affairs. It investigates the potential of the framework that builds on Bourdieu's social interpretations of the 'international' as a field characterised by 'power struggles' and of 'practices' as 'cultural strategies' in the international arena; it also draws on the conceptualisation of 'agency' as a 'social power production'. It argues that science and practice hang together and act as players in external affairs. It applies this framework to the illustrative example of the European Union (EU) and member states' response to Russia's 2022 incursion into Ukraine, demonstrating harmonised positions. It explores how combined social science and politics help connect to the 'symbolic power struggles' that lead to 'social power production' as an agency motivating the EU and member states to adopt a common front. The empirical analysis employs the notions of Ethos, Foreign Policy Identity, Power, Trust and Uncertainty, and the Symbolic Struggle to uncover the crucial trend of social science and practice playing a role in foreign policy. The conclusion concedes criticism from other models; however, despite this framework's lack of extensive use, it hints at its potential usage within diverse case studies. The analysis is based on the author's reflections on data drawn from primary and secondary sources and observations of foreign affairs practices. By capturing the symbolic power struggles that the research of the rationalist (neo-realism), soft-constructivist, and radical constructivist camps omitted to represent, this article helps to highlight the importance of the scientific agents revealing influences on foreign policy.

Keywords: European Union, Bourdieu, Social Science, Practices, Russia, Ukraine

INTRODUCTION

Practice scholars (Pouliot & Cornut, 2015) seek analytical and empirical challenges to explore the synergies affecting international politics. They visualise the 'polity' offered to the outside world as a historical and 'cultural' combination of practices. As an accumulation of practices, this polity concerns human interactions and forms the key elements of agents' external affairs, the European Union, a state, or any other actor (Sending, 2015; Pouliot & Cornut, 2015, p. 309). Practices are processes that involve a flow of dynamics. They might be understood as socially meaningful patterns of activities. As an analytical lens, the practice mechanism is ideally suited to studying diplomacy and foreign policy (Pouliot & Cornut, 2015, p. 298). A focus on practice relocates the existing approaches to power and influence in external affairs,

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demonstrating that power also emerges locally from social contexts (Adler-Nissen & Pouliot, 2014, p. 889).

The dynamics within world politics often lead to contrasting courses and configurations, such as promoting security and, at the same time, creating instability. An example of this is Putin's Russia's declared intention to sponsor security by trespassing across the borders of another state, Ukraine. The appointed leaders' arbitrary rules and reckless discipline act to reinforce the oligarchic nature of global governance (cfr. Pouliot & Cornut, 2015). The illustration of this model is linked to political leaders disregarding the concept that states' sovereignty must be respected. In contrast, 'the presence of new inductees, the revision of certain game rules, and a changing club ethos suggest a trend toward more inclusiveness' (Pouliot & Cornut, 2015, p. 307). This trend evokes the image of Ukraine and its leader as a new resource, which encouraged the European Union's revision of its rules, leading to the EU embracing a more inclusive choice, completely altering the group's attitude and code. Practices resting on older diplomatic forms might create tension within the politics of external affairs and cause changes to the evolution of the external order (cfr. Pouliot & Cornut, 2015). This is highly applicable to the 'Soviet legacies' and 'systemic characters' central to those who believe that an 'unfinished revolution' continues to motivate the Russian leaders' behaviour (McFaul, 2001).[b]

Bourdieu explains the above dynamics lucidly. At the collective form of action and political level, strategies aim to impose a new construction of social reality. The most representative of these tactics are those that seek retrospectively to re-create a past fitted to the needs of the present or construct 'the future by a creative prediction designed to limit the ever-open sense of the present' (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 21). Bourdieu synthesises circumstances and behaviour that adapt to present-day Putin's Russia and demand our attention. His intuitions suggest that science and practice play a role in external affairs, such as affecting policies. We explore these perceptions through a case study or illustrative example. Since practices that repeat the past damage other countries' actors' policies, including those of the European Union and its member states, our illustrative example deals with the EU and member states' responses to Russia's 2022 incursion into Ukraine, which delivered coordinated positions. The illustrative example facilitates the study of the mechanism underlying the methodological approach. Hence, the information on the developments that characterised the European and the EU's attitude toward Russia is limited to this scope.

This article draws on Bourdieu's social interpretation of politics and external affairs based on a belief that the 'international', as a field, is characterised by power struggles, where practices are 'cultural strategies' in the international field (Williams, 2007; Pouliot, 2008, p. 259). This reading suggests that social science and politics are closely connected. This article also draws on Bourdieu's conceptualisation of 'agency' as a 'social production of forms of power' (Berling, 2012, p. 451). Based on these interacting interpretations, this paper argues that science and practice hang together and act as a player in external affairs. This binomial explains the relevance of this framework for recovering the 'symbolic power struggles' that underlie the positions within foreign and security policy. Applying this framework to the illustrative example, this article explains what motivated the common front displayed by the EU and its member states. Moreover, this article explores how combined social science and

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[b] The inverted commas are mine.

politics help uncover the 'symbolic power struggles' that lead to the 'social power production' as an agency affecting the EU and its member states' coordinated front. Symbolic is a term related to representativeness. These connections guide our paper, where we interchangeably use the phrases 'social power production', 'social production of forms of power', and 'social forms of power'.

This article is organised into sections complemented by insights regarding the literature. The following section explains the argument that guided this exploration and is followed by the section on the framework's relevance to this enquiry. The subsequent section discusses the definitions and terminology (the concepts applied to the empirical data), after which the outline of the illustrative example is presented ('Science' and 'practice' in foreign policy: An illustrative example). Here, an insight is provided on how the EU and member states attempted to reinstate the balance between social science and practice responsible for maintaining stability in the international field – which is opposed by Russia's most recent invasion; the central policies, in this regard, are specified. Next, the empirical analysis is structured into four sections: ethos, foreign policy identity, power, trust and uncertainty, and the symbolic struggle. The symbolic struggle will be the most productive of the analytical parameters, revealing various possible ways to associate social science with practices. The conclusion stresses the potential of this framework and its contribution, as well as its wider, limited use. The article ends with a call to researchers, offering hints at the further exploration of science and practice in foreign affairs that may either disprove or enrich the findings presented here.

THE ARGUMENT

As stated in the introduction, Bourdieu's social interpretation of politics and external affairs is centred on the principle that the 'international', as a field, is characterised by power struggles and also by practices that he conceptualises as 'cultural strategies' in the international field (Williams, 2007; Pouliot, 2008, p. 259). This definition implies that social science is not neutral as a practice (cfr. Bourdieu, 2004) and suggests that social science acts as a player. Taking the example of the EU's role in external security affairs, with the fall of the Iron Curtain, states and military forces were no longer essential actors in the international realm (Council of the European Union, 2003). Power resources no longer focused on the military (Nye 2007), and power had undergone a sort of transformation (Solana 2008); there were no other forms of power (UN 1992). The EU felt it had found its realm of representation (Manners, 2008; Council of the European Union, 2003). Human and cultural strategies (social science) represented a reconfiguration of the security field.

During the Kosovo conflict (1998/99) that took place during this period of transformation, the most openly declared military construct, NATO, felt the need to convert its military capital. Huysmans (2002) recalls that the Alliance adapted its power into 'humanitarian capital'. NATO aimed to remodel itself as a peace-supporting actor, targeting reconciliation and stability in the area (Chawla, 2000). This development produced the humanitarian verification mission, the Kosovo Force (KFOR), that operated closely with the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)-led Kosovo Verification Mission. The Alliance confirmed its legitimacy by becoming a cooperative player that sided with other actors (Balanzino, 1999). The EU,

in particular, noted these transformations (Shepherd, 2009). NATO's conversion was vital since it found a joint activity with the European security of the European Union (Stabile et al. 2018). European foreign and security policy was also affected (Tunander et al. 1997). With a focus on the changes caused by the demise of the Soviet Union, Javier Solana, who was General Secretary of NATO (1995-99) at that time and an attentive observer of European affairs,[c] stated: '[expectations] told us that NATO enlargement and NATO-Russia relationship would be mutually exclusive goals. Practice proved otherwise' (Solana, 1999; Berling, 2012, pp. 456-7).

Solana's observation suggests that 'human and cultural strategies' and 'practice' (in other words, social science and politics) represented an actor during the Alliance's renovation. This discourse and discussion define the case for this paper, which argues that science and practice hang together in the field of external affairs and act as a player.

THE FRAMEWORK'S RELEVANCE TO THE ENQUIRY

To understand this framework's relevance to our enquiry, we focus, again, on the international structure that was undergoing a readjustment due to the end of the Cold War and on the fact that theorists struggled to comprehend the new developments. The 'symbolic power struggle', at which Bourdieu (1986, p. 23) hints, testified to the adaptation of NATO, within which process 'social science' played a role. That 'struggle' remained unexplored by scholars. The approaches that explained the new conditions in the international realm were the rationalists and the reflectivists (Keohane, 1988). The rationalist model (also identified as a variant of (neo-)Realism) emphasised rational state actors and an international system that was characterised by a balance of power and alliance-building (Walt, 1987; Waltz, 1993, 2000). To these approaches, the end of the Cold War was unexpected; what appeared as a stable but delicate balance of power setting in a bipolar configuration abruptly ended. The disbanding of NATO was seen as a coherent conclusion, consequent to the absence of an outside corresponding opponent to the Alliance (Berling, 2012, p. 453).

Contrasting this interpretation, variants of reflectivism (soft-constructivism and radical constructivism) emerged. Soft-constructivism recognised that norms are a prevailing variable (Emmanuel Adler & Barnett, 1998; Emmanuel Adler, 1997; Rissen-Kappen, 1996). Radical constructivism is more directly engaged with language and its role in helping to represent social reality (Toews, 1987). Alongside these positions, the changes in European security and the survival of NATO were interpreted as a case for the continuity of the importance of shared norms within security communities (Emmanuel Adler & Barnett 1998; Pouliot 2006). Alternatively, they were assumed to be either a construction of a specific NATO security narrative or an idea of the self that remodelled international relations after bipolarity (Ciuta, 2002; Fierke & Wiener, 1999; Hansen, 1995; Neumann, 1999; Williams & Neumann, 2000). Neither of these approaches represented the symbolic power struggle that guided the renewal of NATO,

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[c] Solana would later cover the role of General Secretary of the European Council and High Representative of the Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union (1999-2009).

NATO's role in European security, and the European foreign and security policy itself. The role of the social scientific agents was vital (Berling, 2012, p. 453).

The social scientific agents are essential and support our challenging of the approaches that omitted the representation of their role. Linked to the contention that it is impossible to understand foreign policy without revealing the 'social struggles' that might have influenced it (Berling, 2012, p. 459), in contrast to others, we feature them. This justifies the framework's relevance to this enquiry to the extent that it recovers the 'symbolic power struggles' that explain the positions within foreign and security policy. Their recovery will enable us to identify and link to the 'social power production' in its function of agency. The latter might have motivated the harmonised European position. The whole concretely means showing how social science and politics are at work in an attempt to define European foreign and security policy.

THE CONCEPTS APPLIED TO THE EMPIRICAL DATA

To clarify the concepts employed in this paper, we begin by explaining, in line with Bourdieu, that 'field' is the term that we use to indicate 'international relations' since it suggests a weakly institutionalised social space, or domain, where non-institutionalised practices are set, and explored (cfr. Wacquant 1989). In the weakly institutionalised social space, we may find the symbolic struggles that aim at transforming perceptions of the world into legitimate principles (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 20). In a similar context, we may detect or discover the 'social power production' (or 'social production of the forms of power') that Bourdieu describes as a 'symbolic' manifestation of the 'social reality'. It is intended to be an essential structure for the human beings who dwell within it (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 15). The construction of social reality might become a collective enterprise because many agents might attend to it. The agents' perception of the world is embodied in their power struggle (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 19), which might be engulfed by social constraints (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 18). Agents might live within different realities and under various conditions, with varying priorities, as occurs within the European Union member states.

To obtain the perspective of the symbolic power struggle that might have swayed the EU policy, Bourdieu offers capital (resources) as a carrier and generator of influence. Capital is a 'relational power', implying that it requires recognition by others to be accepted as authoritative in a specific field (Bourdieu 1986, p. 17). The 'sensitivity to capital' serves to recognise the agency. To localise the sensitivity to capital, we selected four features that represent the synthesis of 'science and practice': ethos, foreign policy identity, power, trust and uncertainty, and the symbolic struggle. We will explore whether these were the resources (the Bourdieuan capital) that engendered the influence, in other words, the agency that made an impact. They would indicate whether people's feelings (the member states' foreign ministers and EU diplomats) might coalesce or disentangle around the capital. In other words, if ethos appears meaningful in terms of a shared disposition (by the EU officials and member states), the consequence would be that this probably acted as an agent that merged people's wants and drove them towards harmonisation. We focus on these relations to bring the 'symbolic power struggle' to light, leading to the 'social power production' as an agent inspiring the EU and member states' positions.

'SCIENCE' AND 'PRACTICE' IN FOREIGN POLICY: AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE

The most articulated interpretation of how 'practices' and 'social science' are associated within foreign policy contends that a focus on the local reveals the people's perspective regarding the act of 'producing Europe' (Adler-Nissen, 2016, p. 88; Bicchi, 2016, p. 462). Practices that influence the European Union and its member states created situations in 2022 that would have been difficult to anticipate. Our theoretical discussion persuaded us that social science replaced the military as a value in international affairs. In 2008, and even earlier, however, 'symptoms breaking the balance between science and practice became evident due to the occupation of Georgia by the Russian forces. That balance was again brought into crisis. It was further eroded in 2014, with the incursion and occupation of Crimea, and finally reached breaking point eight years later, with Ukraine. The equilibrium between values and actions had vanished. The member states and the EU wished to re-create it and ensure that the 'field' enjoyed stability, which explains why they agitated and rejected the rupture. Practices and social science became crucially interconnected in the eyes of the Europeans and their policy.

Within this social science and practice framework, which upholds their theoretical connection, we see the EU and the member states engaging in collective diplomacy. Combined and meaningful diplomacy uses a variety of tools in an attempt to restore the science and practices' binomial. Sanctions concerning trade and the financial sector and separately directed sanctions against designated persons were practices that the Europeans and the EU adopted. Macro-financial and economic provisions, comprising aid for refugees within and beyond Ukraine's boundaries, were further practices adopted. A €2.5 billion package of direct military support to Ukraine via the recently established European Peace Facility (EPF) was another measure implemented (Maurer et al., 2023, p. 220). Reduced dependence on Russian gas was a further practice decided in Versailles in March 2022. Science also played a role: the EU and member states reconsidered the Union's accession rules and re-examined its future dimension of offering Ukraine the candidature for membership.[d] Finland and Sweden modified their previous status as EU members who were external to the Alliance and joined NATO. Russia's most recent invasion opposed the share of social science and practices, but the member states and the EU strove to reinstate the balance.

Regarding the empirical analysis, we explore how science and practice provided the basis for the common stances constituting the reaction to the invasion. We aim to recover the 'symbolic power struggles' (explaining foreign policy), in contrast to the rationalist, realist, and soft- and radical constructivist approaches that neglected this focus. The exploratory tools of Ethos, Foreign Policy Identity, Power, Trust and Uncertainty, and the Symbolic Struggle guide our investigation. We enquire whether these were the agencies that created influence, thus leading to the recovery of the symbolic power struggles.

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

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[d] Together with Georgia and Moldova.

Ethos

Social reality is a set of invisible relations constituting a universe of positions (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 16). This Bourdieuan explanation of the social space describes a process by which the fundamental political convictions of those 'who are expected to be explicit' shift their position to a related direction (cfr. Kratochwil, 1993; Glarbo, 1990, p. 644). This social reality represents the situation in which the EU and member states confronted their choice of European foreign policy. How the science-practice relation is respected here, leads us to view ethos as a moral belief. Ethos is recognised as a state of mind and a sentiment underlying actions (cfr. Maurer et al., 2023). As an ethical value, it is accounted for by science. Contributing to ethos are the practices of diplomats and foreign ministers, representing the 'capital', using a Bourdieuan term to translate their resources and power into a decision.

Understanding whether ethos might have linked people so powerfully to enable eliding diversities requires an exploration of ethos in the role of agency. Under this aspect, diplomats could influence an ethos, especially those linked to the defence and security think tanks. The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI),[e] and Leonardo,[f] formerly Finmeccanica, both operating mid-way between foreign policy and security policy, could leave an imprint on ethos. The European Union Military Committee (EUCM) and its representatives were in a position to contribute towards forming a consensus as a collective agency. With its expertise in diplomacy and in-depth knowledge of the policy area, the EUCM was well-placed to affect decisions. Almost two decades ago, it was instrumental in supporting[g] the need for European integration in the political and security area (Cross, 2013, p. 156). These contributions to ethos, as an agent, were influential, but not in a way that would engender a social power production.

In the supposed role of the agent, ethos requires social forces to deliver social power production. There were a few hints at this, such as reporting that the habit of travelling together makes it more accessible, and also more regular, to seek a consensus within a new situation. Alternatively, the sense of 'togetherness' was revealed by the position: 'If a country has a genuine problem, very few people will fail to try to come to terms with this; I think that [it] is a powerful principle' (Glarbo, 1990, p. 644). These faint allusions to social power incorporate the role of agency.

We provided evidence of the connection between science and practice and the two leading to the agency, albeit faintly. 'Ethos' might have been engendered to oppose Russia's violence. Nevertheless, we have seen no indications of actual social processes, particularly ones that become entangled with the power struggle created by ethos, as a response to Russia's violence. We then focus on whether foreign policy identity was a

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[e] RUSI, Royal United Services Institute, is a defence and security think tank headquartered in London.

[f] Leonardo, formerly Finmeccanica, based in Rome, is one of the world's largest arms companies. According to SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), it made arms sales of $11.2 Billion in 2021, 73% of total company sales. (SIPRI 31st October 2022).

[g] The 2005 'Long-Term Vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs'.

valuable asset, as an agency connected to science and practice and the social fabrication of influence.

FOREIGN POLICY IDENTITY

Bourdieu set the angle of observation on 'identity': it would be misguided to believe that, within a group, the similar social and political conditions of the components make them appear as a class with a shared identity (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 17). The direct reference is the group of EU diplomats and member states' foreign ministers, where identity is perceived as united in diversity (Powers, 2022). Identity is a state of concreteness generated by joint efforts. As social science and practice gain real power of construction, 'coordination', alone, counts for 'imposing measures' and designing 'working agreements', for which an 'arrangement' suffices outside a 'real consensus' (Eriksen, 2009, pp. 49-53; Sjursen & Rosen, 2017, p. 23).[h] These two phenomena, social science and practice, proved the real power of construction by renewing the EU's parts of a multidimensional approach to crises (Council of the European Union, 2018). They provided evidence of the EU engaging as 'the main player…on the part of the West' (Karolewski & Cross, 2017, p. 143); harmonisation with the US (on sanctions), with the IMF (on financial assistance to Ukraine) and collaboration with OSCE (on the ceasefire monitoring) were expressions of the foreign and security policy of the EU and its member states (European Council, 2023). With Bourdieu, it would be erroneous to consider this 'power of construction' as a manifestation of identity.

Social science capitalised on several assets that have been able to realise: the Global Strategy (2016) and the Strategic Compass (2022), the securitisation of Ukraine (via the European Peace Facility), and the support of key problem areas (the Military Assistance Mission to Ukraine). These choices were the product of a 'sense of necessity' or simply of a 'mutual understanding' of emergencies (Schilde, 2017).[i] The Russian invasion commanded a drive and reminded the member states and the EU that 'capital' (in the Bourdieuan sense of resources) could articulate a clear, understandable voice. This voice was not to be confused with identity but connected to social science and its capability to acquire absolute power.

Identity and foreign policy offered no perspective on the 'symbolic power struggle' anticipated by Bourdieu, and in particular of a role as an agent who contributes to the EU's harmonised answer to the attack launched against Ukraine. We continue investigating and turn to power and its binomial with trust and uncertainty.

POWER, TRUST AND UNCERTAINTY

We imagine the EU and its member states as existing in a condition of anxiety concerning the state of the world. The circumstances surrounding Russia and Ukraine prove this. Being under structural constraints, they build their vision.

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[h] The inverted commas are mine.
[i] The inverted commas are mine.

Uncertainty…provides a basis for the plurality of visions of the world which is itself linked to the plurality of points of view. At the same time, it provides a base for *symbolic struggles* over the power to produce and impose the legitimate vision of the world' (Bourdieu 1986, p. 20).[j]

As Bourdieu explains, having constructed a 'social space' shared by the EU and its member states, there will be differing or even antagonistic points of view. Every agent's vision of the space depends on the position adopted therein. Trust is continuously confronted. Ruptures of commonality are conceivable. Would the actors, the member states and the EU, 'continue to support' Ukraine, and 'until when' are demands that feed this uncertainty? A possible alternative sees them becoming 'accustomed' to Russia's warfare. The separation of trust from power materialises in different hypotheses concerning the actors' future behaviour.

Under uncertainty, trust is a type of reaction that the agents activate (Booth & Wheeler, 2008, p. 230; Natorski & Pomorksa, 2017, p. 57). Trust might have influenced the EU's capacity to exercise power over Russia by exhibiting unitary actions as the sum of the member states' foreign policy and desires. 'Uncertainty, trust and power' interfere as distinct instruments offering the prospect of the 'symbolic struggles' to provide a suitable world image. A symbolic struggle is a valuable asset, making sense of the coordination of views; we dig more deeply into this field, assuming that its exploration might lead to a grasp of agency as a 'social power production' or an explanation of its implications.

SYMBOLIC STRUGGLE

As Bourdieu leads us to understand, when the social space, seen by the EU and member states, emerges from considerably uncertain world relations, their search for strategies is intense (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 20). They might be influenced by symbolic struggles and symbolic struggles also by others, such as by those in Russia's social space seeking a legitimate vision of the world. Their sought legitimate vision might differ from the reality in which they live. We have already noted that the construction of social reality, as within Russia itself, might become a collective enterprise burdened by social constraints (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 18). Symbolic struggles regarding the perception of the world bring to light 'certain realities' (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 20); these constitute a practical manifestation, 'whose goal is to exhibit a group, its size, its strengths, its cohesiveness,' all factors that enhance the group's visibility (Champagne, 1984; Bourdieu, 1986, p. 20).

Several examples fall under Bourdieu's definition: the social processes underway in Russia, the Russian diaspora and the myriads of cases, such as the detention and death of Navalny and his 'gained recognition' as a supporter of legitimate visions of the world (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 23). Bourdieu tells us that the 'symbolic power' of the struggles over the perception of the world rests on the possession of the 'social authority' that was acquired during previous struggles (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 23). He adds that the 'power of the struggles' depends on the degree to which their proposed vision is founded on 'reality' (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 23). The realities in Russia's social space

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[j] Italics is mine.

prove the authenticity of the context and the authority that was socially gained during the preceding struggles. These instances form the basis of what Bourdieu defines as the 'social power production' (cfr. Bourdieu, 1986). The social production of the forms of power is the most potent political power (Bourdieu 1986, p. 23); it materialises as an agency.

When applied to the EU, these Bourdieuan notions of science and relative practices suggest that the EU and its member states are conscious that the strategies they support affect the social sphere within Russia (and, at the same time, are affected by their policies). This is the case for the sanctions and all of the other interventions we described (including relinquishing the gas market). They had already experienced the symbolic struggles that accompanied the transformation of their foreign and security policy during the structural adaptations induced by the end of the Cold War and understood the importance that 'values' acquired. The integrated approach of the EU and member states' foreign and security policy (Council of the European Union, 2018) is committed to nurturing 'just and inclusive societies' (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 4) and supporting 'local actors for peace' (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 5). This means they respect the legitimacy of those in Russia's social space seeking a change and wish 'values' to substitute the 'military' with science and practice. As Bourdieu reiterates, a symbolic power struggle embodies the most significant manifestation of power (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 23).

The conviction that 'promoting human security...increases the security of the EU and its citizens' was a legal clause included in the institutional security documents, and, at the same time, the vision that responded to the challenges within the immediate neighbourhood (Council of the European Union 2018, p. 2). From a Bourdieuan viewpoint, the EU and the member states were not insensitive to the power production of Russia's social space, nor to their struggle to transform the world's perceptions to impose the legitimate principle. Social science and practice, in other words, science and politics, demonstrate consistency. In their 'legitimate visions of the world', the EU and its member states confronted the external conflict and crises through coordinated positions. The analytical framework, built on interpretations by Bourdieu of the 'international' as a field in which 'practices' as 'cultural strategies' met 'social power productions', proved capable of showing how science and practice played a role in the linkage to the symbolic power struggles, thus explaining the EU and member states' harmonised answer to Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

CONCLUSION

This article on Bourdieuan Perspectives on Social Power Production focused on social science, practices, agency and power, and their role in international affairs. The interpretation of the international as a field of power struggles, where the practices are cultural strategies, has supported the association of science and practice as an actor. Based on the concepts of Bourdieu, his identification of 'agency' with a 'social power production', and the relevance of recovering the 'symbolic power struggles' that underlie foreign policy, this article investigated this framework's potential. It applied this frame to the case of the EU and member states' harmonised responses to Russia's 2022 incursion into Ukraine. It identified a crucial trend whereby social science and practice play a role in foreign policy. This finding resulted from the enquiry into how

social science and politics, combined, promote the linkage to the symbolic power struggles leading to 'social power production' as an agency affecting the EU and member states' coordinated front. The notions of ethos, foreign policy identity, power, trust, uncertainty, and symbolic struggle contributed to the empirical analysis, which revealed this crucial finding. By capturing the 'symbolic power struggles' that refer to the structural adjustments and transformations experienced by the political actors, this paper challenged the approaches that omitted these representations (the rationalist model, variant of (neo-)realism, and reflectivism, soft-constructivism and radical constructivism), while simultaneously stressing the importance of the scientific agents revealing influences on foreign policy. This article has shown that the symbolic power struggle displaying the greatest manifestation of power, in Bourdieuan terms, originated in Russia's social space—struggling to substitute the 'military' with 'values', as the European Union and its member states themselves did during the period of external affairs' adaptation with the end of the Cold War.

The findings clarified the flow of trying to locate the social power production. They demonstrated how each investigated segment looped back to the connection between social science and practice. At every stage, whether it was ethos, identity, or the connection between power, trust and uncertainty, the findings exposed how binomial science and practice advanced the exploration of the struggles. They indicated that, with world relations appearing severely uncertain, many developments emerged: the search for strategies became intense; the search for a social space transformed into a 'symbolic struggle'; this 'symbolic struggle' converted into the 'social power production'. The findings demonstrated how the latter acted as an agency calling for legitimate visions of the world. The analysis showed how the EU and its member states were not insensitive to the 'social power production' within Russia's social space, which was the most potent political power by any means, according to Bourdieu's definition, aiming to transform the perceptions of the world to impose the legitimate principle. The analysis confirmed how this vision was linked with the integrated approach to external conflicts and crises among the EU and the member states, indicating the harmonised position.

Despite successfully demonstrating how science and practice act as a player in the field of foreign affairs, this Bourdieuan-inspired framework might attract criticism. It may be argued that it has a limited scope in explaining global politics that alternative theories, such as geopolitical lenses, explain in more detail. Geopolitical views describe how states lead their foreign and security policy within the external powers and balances' complex affairs. However, these would scarcely reveal the social power that informs the policy-making, as grasped through Bourdieuan insights. The (neo-)realists, who have been challenged here, would probably argue that Bourdieuan intuitions miss the understanding of states as 'rational actors' and of the 'international system' as being embodied by a 'balance of power', as Russia, the US and China would indicate. Also, the theorists who recognise the role of 'language' (rather than social struggles) in defining the social reality within international politics, like the radical constructivists, would, possibly, highlight the shortcomings of the concepts derived from Bourdieu to understand international affairs. This Bourdieuan-inspired framework has limited potential regarding universal application.

Whether other illustrative examples would benefit from this methodological model arises. Bourdieu's social science and practice's other application would explain

how Marie Curie's combined science and practice throughout her experiments enabled her to discover and produce forms of power (radium and polonium). The application would also show forms of energy in the social field by indicating how the discovery met the needs of those injured due to the First World War (X-ray images).[k]Another illustrative case would focus on how science and practice, jointly active in space agencies and research activity, form the basis of producing the forms of power. The so-called 'Space Station Leads to Breakthroughs in Human Health on Earth',[l] which aims to create protein aggregations, and test them on Alzheimer's disease, is an example.

One might ask whether insights into 'social power production' inform policymaking or international relations strategies. Social power production might be represented in various ways. It qualifies itself as an influence connected to the social domain. We foresee insights into social power production associated with internal politics or external affairs. This framework may alert policymakers to the opportunities or risks, benefits or vulnerability concerning the policies within their state; this applies to the situations created during the Covid period, when vaccines, as a product of 'science and practice', led to varying reactions, that we recognise as a 'social production of power'. Policymakers might be encouraged to 'adapt' their policy. With effects on external politics, the model's implications would be observed in the North-South cooperation over migration, where cooperation, as a product of 'science and practice', may induce reactions in the form of social power production as a response to the strategy. Policymakers may choose to 'alter' the external strategy that they negotiated at the international level.

Finally, having completed several tasks and explored the gain of having traced dynamics that other models ignored, hinting at other illustrative examples and criticism from alternative theoretical views, we hope that researchers of international affairs might feel encouraged by our investigation. They might find other avenues for research in order to explore, for example, how another theory or methodological model might reinforce or counter the central argument of this article, which is to recognise how science and practice play a role in foreign affairs, and either confirm of disprove the findings disclosed here.

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[k] Marie Curie's application of science and practice certainly led to the negative outcome of employing radium in what caused the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings.
[l] Retrieved from: https://www.nasa.gov/missions/station/space-station-leads-to-breakthroughs-in-human-health-on-earth/

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